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ABSTRACT
We analyze how changes in government policy affect stock prices. Our general equilibrium model
features uncertainty about government policy and a government that has both economic and non-economic
motives. The government tends to change its policy after performance downturns in the private sector.
Stock prices fall at the announcements of policy changes, on average. The price fall is expected to
be large if uncertainty about government policy is large, as well as if the policy change is preceded
by a short or shallow downturn. Policy changes increase volatility, risk premia, and correlations among
stocks. The jump risk premium associated with policy decisions is positive, on average.
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Governments shape the environment in which the private sector operates. They aﬀect ﬁrms
in many ways: they levy taxes, provide subsidies, enforce laws, regulate competition, deﬁne
environmental policies, etc. In short, governments set the rules of the game.
Governments change these rules from time to time, eliciting price reactions in ﬁnancial
markets. These reactions are weak if the change is widely anticipated, but they can be
strong if the markets are caught by surprise. This paper analyzes the eﬀects of changes
in government policy on stock prices in a theoretical setting. Naturally, government policy
changes are not exogenously given; they are determined by various economic and political
forces. To account for this endogeneity, we develop a simple asset pricing model in which
the government plays the role of an active decision maker.
We interpret policy changes broadly as government actions that change the economic
environment. Recent examples include the health care reform and the ongoing overhaul of
ﬁnancial regulation. Another example is the U.S. government’s decision to allow Lehman
Brothers to go bankrupt in 2008, which was perceived by many as signaling a shift in the
government’s implicit too-big-to-fail policy. Numerous other government policy changes also
took place during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008. Many of those changes were unprece-
dented, with long-term eﬀects that were diﬃcult to predict in advance.
A key role in our analysis belongs to uncertainty about government policy, which is an
inevitable by-product of policymaking. We consider two types of uncertainty. The ﬁrst type,
which we call policy uncertainty, relates to the uncertain impact of a given government policy
on the proﬁtability of the private sector. The second type, which we call political uncertainty,
captures the private sector’s uncertainty whether the current government policy will change.
In other words, there is uncertainty about what the government is going to do, as well as
what the eﬀect of its action is going to be. We ﬁnd that both types of uncertainty aﬀect
stock prices in important ways.
We develop a general equilibrium model in which ﬁrm proﬁtability follows a stochastic
process whose mean is aﬀected by the prevailing government policy. The policy’s impact on
the mean is uncertain. Both the government and the investors (ﬁrm owners) learn about
this impact in a Bayesian fashion by observing realized proﬁtability. All agents have the
same prior beliefs about the current policy’s impact, and the same beliefs apply to any other
future government policy. The prior standard deviation is labeled “policy uncertainty.”
1At a given point in time, the government decides whether or not to change its policy. If a
policy change occurs, the agents’ beliefs are reset: the posterior beliefs about the old policy’s
impact are replaced by the prior beliefs about the new policy’s impact. When making its
policy decision, the government is motivated by both economic and non-economic objectives:
it maximizes the investors’ welfare, as a social planner would, but it also takes into account
the political cost (or beneﬁt) incurred by changing the policy. This cost is unknown to the
investors, who therefore cannot fully anticipate whether the policy change will occur. The
standard deviation of the political cost is labeled “political uncertainty.”
We ﬁnd that it is optimal for the government to replace its policy by a new one if
the old policy’s impact on proﬁtability is perceived as suﬃciently unfavorable; i.e., if the
posterior mean of the impact is below a given threshold. This threshold decreases with policy
uncertainty as well as with the political cost. If the government derives an unexpectedly large
political beneﬁt from changing its policy, the policy will be replaced even if it worked well
in the past. In expectation, however, the threshold is below the prior mean of the policy’s
impact. To push the posterior mean below the prior mean, Bayes’ rule dictates that the
signal—the realized proﬁtability in the private sector—must be lower than expected. As
a result, policy changes are expected to occur after periods of unexpectedly low realized
proﬁtability, which we refer to as “downturns.”
We derive the conditions under which stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy
change. There are two eﬀects. First, a policy change typically increases the ﬁrms’ expected
future proﬁtability, as a direct result of the government’s optimal decision rule described in
the previous paragraph. This cash ﬂow eﬀect generally pushes stock prices up. Second, a
policy change increases the discount rates because the new policy’s impact on proﬁtability is
more uncertain; adopting a new policy essentially undoes the gains from learning about the
old policy. This discount rate eﬀect pushes stock prices down. We ﬁnd that the discount rate
eﬀect is stronger than the cash ﬂow eﬀect unless the old policy’s impact on proﬁtability is
perceived as suﬃciently negative. That is, stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy
change unless the posterior mean of the old policy’s impact is below a negative threshold.
This threshold is generally below the policy-change-triggering threshold discussed in the pre-
vious paragraph. Stock prices rise if the government replaces an old policy so unproductive
that its posterior mean falls below both thresholds.
We ﬁnd that, on average, stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy change.
Positive announcement returns are typically small because they tend to occur in states of the
world in which the policy change is largely anticipated by investors. Given the government’s
2economic motive, any policy change that lifts stock prices is mostly expected, so that much of
its eﬀect is priced in before the announcement. In contrast, negative announcement returns
tend to be larger because they occur when the announcement of a policy change contains
a bigger element of surprise. The probability distribution of the announcement returns is
left-skewed and, most interesting, its mean is below zero. We prove analytically that the
expected value of the stock return at the announcement of a policy change is negative.
We also show numerically that this expected announcement return is more negative when
there is more uncertainty about government policy. When policy uncertainty is larger, so is
the risk associated with a new policy, and so is the discount rate eﬀect that pushes stock
prices down when the new policy is announced. When political uncertainty is larger, so is
the element of surprise in the announcement of a policy change.
We relate the stock return at the announcement of a policy change to the length and
depth of the preceding downturn. We ﬁnd that the announcement returns are negative
especially after downturns that are short or shallow. The announcement returns can also be
positive, mostly after downturns that are long or deep. However, such positive returns tend
to be small because after long or deep downturns, policy changes are largely anticipated.
Before the announcement of a policy decision, investors are uncertain whether the policy
will change. If it does change, stock prices tend to jump down; if it does not change, prices
tend to jump up. The expected jump in stock prices at the announcement of a policy decision
is generally nonzero. This expected jump captures the risk premium demanded by investors
for facing an uncertain jump in the stochastic discount factor when the policy decision is
announced. The conditional jump risk premium can be positive or negative, depending
on the posterior mean of the policy impact. The unconditional premium is positive and
increasing in both policy uncertainty and political uncertainty.
The volatilities and correlations of stock returns are also aﬀected by changes in govern-
ment policy. By introducing new policies whose impact is more uncertain, policy changes
increase the volatility of the stochastic discount factor. As a result, risk premia go up and
stock returns become more volatile and more highly correlated across ﬁrms. All of these
eﬀects are stronger when policy uncertainty is larger. Before a policy change, stock returns
are aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in the investors’ beliefs about the current policy as well as in
the investors’ assessment of the probability of a policy change. The latter ﬂuctuations stop
after the government makes its policy decision, typically resulting in lower volatilities and
correlations if the decision does not change the prevailing policy.
3The government’s ability to change its policy has a substantial eﬀect on stock prices. We
compare the model-implied stock prices with their counterparts in a hypothetical scenario
in which policy changes are precluded. We ﬁnd that the government’s ability to change its
policy ampliﬁes the stock price declines around policy changes. In addition, this ability can
imply a higher or lower level of stock prices compared to the hypothetical scenario.
In the benchmark version of our model, discussed above, the government can change
its policy only at a predetermined point in time. In the ﬁrst extension of the model, we
endogenize the timing of the policy change, by letting the government solve for the optimal
time to change the policy. We lose our closed-form solutions, but we ﬁnd numerically that
the key results from our benchmark model continue to hold.
In the benchmark model, the ﬁrms’ investment decisions are not modeled explicitly. In
the second extension of the model, we allow ﬁrms to disinvest in response to changes in
government policy. In this extension, the ﬁrms’ investment decisions and the government’s
policy decision are made simultaneously: the government takes into account the ﬁrms’ an-
ticipated response, and each ﬁrm considers the decisions of the other ﬁrms as well as the
government. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, a fraction of ﬁrms remain invested while the
rest hold cash. We show numerically that ﬁrms respond to government-induced uncertainty
by cutting their investment. We also show that our key results continue to hold.
In the third and ﬁnal extension of our model, we introduce heterogeneity in the ﬁrms’
exposures to government policy. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more exposure typically have higher
expected returns, though the premium for government policy risk is state-dependent and can
be negative. The main results from our benchmark model continue to hold.
Prior studies have analyzed the eﬀects of uncertainty, broadly deﬁned, on various aspects
of economic activity. For example, it is well known that uncertainty generally reduces ﬁrm
investment when this investment is at least partially irreversible.1 The impact of uncertainty
about government policy on investment has been analyzed both theoretically and empiri-
cally.2 The literature has also analyzed the eﬀects of uncertainty about government policy
on inﬂation, capital ﬂows, and welfare.3 However, the literature does not have much to say
1See, for example, Bernanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988), and Dixit (1989).
Bloom (2009) provides a structural analysis of various real eﬀects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks.
2For example, Rodrik (1991) shows that even moderate amount of policy uncertainty can impose a hefty
tax on investment. Hassett and Metcalf (1999) ﬁnd that the impact of tax policy uncertainty on investment
depends on the process followed by the tax policy. Julio and Yook (2011) and Yonce (2009) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
reduce their investment in years leading up to major elections. Durnev (2011) ﬁnds that corporate investment
is less sensitive to stock prices during election years.
3For example, Drazen and Helpman (1990) study how uncertainty about a future ﬁscal adjustment aﬀects
4about how this uncertainty aﬀects asset prices, which is the subject of our study. A rare
exception is Sialm (2006), who analyzes the eﬀects of stochastic taxes on asset prices.4 Tax
uncertainty also features in Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2011), who explore its as-
set pricing implications in a production economy with recursive preferences. Finally, Ulrich
(2011) analyzes how bond yields are aﬀected by Knightian uncertainty about both Ricardian
equivalence and the size of the government multiplier. All of these studies are quite diﬀerent
from ours. They analyze ﬁscal policy, whereas we consider a broader set of government ac-
tions. We focus on the stock market reactions to government policy announcements, unlike
any of these studies. These studies use very diﬀerent modeling techniques, and they do not
model the government’s policy decision explicitly as we do. None of these studies feature
Bayesian learning, which plays an important role here.
Our model is also diﬀerent from the learning models that were recently proposed in the
political economy literature, such as Callander (2008) and Strulovici (2010). In Callander’s
model, voters learn about the eﬀects of government policies through repeated elections.
In Strulovici’s model, voters learn about their preferences through policy experimentation.
Neither study analyzes the asset pricing implications of learning.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents the benchmark model. Section 3.
analyzes the equilibrium stock prices. Section 4. extends the model by endogenizing the time
of the policy change. Section 5. extendsthe model by allowing ﬁrms to disinvest inresponse to
government-induced uncertainty. Section 6. introduces heterogeneity in the ﬁrms’ exposures
to government policy. Section 7. concludes. The Appendix contains technical details and a
reference to the Technical Appendix, which contains all the proofs.
2. The Model
We consider an economy with a ﬁnite horizon [0,T] and a continuum of ﬁrms i ∈ [0,1]. Let
Bi
t denote ﬁrm i’s capital at time t. Firms are ﬁnanced entirely by equity, so Bi
t can also
the dynamics of inﬂation. Hermes and Lensink (2001) show that uncertainty about budget deﬁcits, tax
payments, government consumption, and inﬂation is positively related to capital outﬂows at the country level.
Gomes, Kotlikoﬀ, and Viceira (2008) calibrate a life-cycle model to measure the welfare losses resulting from
uncertainty about government policies regarding taxes and Social Security. They ﬁnd that policy uncertainty
materially aﬀects the agents’ consumption, saving, labor supply, and portfolio decisions.
4Other studies, such as McGrattan and Prescott (2005), Sialm (2009), and Gomes, Michaelides, and
Polkovnichenko (2009), relate stock prices to tax rates, without emphasizing tax-related uncertainty. In
empirical work, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) relate political risk to future country stock returns, and
Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2010) relate political uncertainty to stock volatility.
5be viewed as book value of equity. At time 0, all ﬁrms employ an equal amount of capital,
which we normalize to Bi
0 = 1. Firm i’s capital is invested in a linear technology whose rate
of return is stochastic and denoted by dΠi
t. All proﬁts are reinvested, so that ﬁrm i’s capital




t equals proﬁts over book value, we refer to it
as the proﬁtability of ﬁrm i. For all t ∈ [0,T], proﬁtability follows the process
dΠ
i
t = (µ + gt)dt + σdZt + σ1dZ
i
t , (1)
where (µ,σ,σ1) are observable constants, Zt is a Brownian motion, and Zi
t is an independent
Brownian motion that is speciﬁc to ﬁrm i. The variable gt denotes the impact of the prevailing
government policy on the mean of the proﬁtability process of each ﬁrm.5 When gt = 0, the
government policy is “neutral” in that it has no impact on proﬁtability.
The government policy’s impact, gt, is constant while the same policy is in eﬀect. At an
exogenously given time τ, 0 < τ < T, the government makes an irreversible decision whether





gold for t ≤ τ
gold for t > τ if there is no policy change
gnew for t > τ if there is a policy change,
(2)
where gold denotes the impact of the government policy prevailing at time 0. A policy change
replaces gold by gnew, thereby inducing a permanent shift in average proﬁtability. A policy
decision becomes eﬀective immediately after its announcement at time τ.
The value of gt is unknown. This key assumption captures the idea that government
policies have an uncertain impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability. The prior distributions of both gold









for both g ≡ gold and g ≡ gnew. The prior is the same for both policies, the one prevailing
at time 0 and the one that might replace it at time τ. Both policies are expected to be
neutral a priori.7 We refer to σg as policy uncertainty. The value of gt is unknown for all
t ∈ [0,T] to all agents—the government as well as the investors who own the ﬁrms.
5The simplifying assumption that the government policy aﬀects all ﬁrms equally is relaxed in Section 6.
6The simplifying assumption that τ is exogenous allows us to obtain analytical results. Section 4. shows
numerically that all of our key results survive when τ is endogenous, i.e., when the government chooses the
optimal time to change its policy.
7Any government eﬀect on proﬁtability that is stable across policy changes is included in µ.
6The ﬁrms are owned by a continuum of identical investors who maximize expected utility

















T is investor j’s wealth at time T and γ > 1 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
At time 0, all investors are equally endowed with shares of ﬁrm stock. Stocks pay liquidating
dividends at time T.8 Investors observe whether a policy change takes place at time τ.
When making its policy decision at time τ, the government maximizes the same objective
function as the investors, except that it also faces a nonpecuniary cost (or beneﬁt) associated
with a policy change. The government changes its policy if the expected utility under the




















where WT = BT =
R 1
0 Bi
Tdi is the ﬁnal value of aggregate capital and C is the “political
cost” incurred by the government if a new policy is introduced. Values of C > 1 represent
a cost (e.g., the government must exert eﬀort or burn political capital to implement a new
policy), whereas C < 1 represents a beneﬁt (e.g., the government makes a transfer to a
favored constituency, or it simply wants to be seen doing something).9 The value of C is
randomly drawn at time τ from a lognormal distribution centered at C = 1:












where C is independent of the Brownian motions in equation (1). As soon as the value of C
is revealed to the agents at time τ, the government uses it to make the policy decision. We
refer to σc as political uncertainty. Political uncertainty introduces an element of surprise
into policy changes, resulting in stock price reactions at time τ.
Given its objective function in equation (5), the government is “quasi-benevolent”: it is
expected to maximize the investors’ welfare (because E[C] = 1), but also to deviate from
this objective in a random fashion. The assumption that governments do not behave as fully
benevolent social planners is widely accepted in the political economy literature.10 This
8No dividends are paid before time T because the investors’ preferences (equation (4)) do not involve
intermediate consumption. Firms in our model reinvest all of their earnings, as mentioned earlier.
9We refer to C as a cost because higher values of C translate into lower utility (since W
1−γ
T /(1 − γ) < 0).
The assumption that this cost is nonpecuniary simpliﬁes the analysis. Pecuniary costs would eventually be
passed on to the investors, and modeling this transmission would be distracting given our objectives.
10Drazen (2000) provides a useful overview of this literature.
7literature presents various reasons why governments might not maximize aggregate welfare.
For example, governments often redistribute wealth.11 Governments tend to be inﬂuenced
by special interest groups.12 They might also be susceptible to corruption.13 Instead of mod-
eling these political forces explicitly, we adopt a simple reduced-form approach to capturing
departures from benevolence. In our model, all aspects of politics—redistribution, corrup-
tion, special interests, etc.—are bundled together in the political cost C. The randomness of
C reﬂects the diﬃculty in predicting the outcome of a political process, which can be com-
plex and non-transparent. For example, it can be hard to predict the outcome of a battle
between special interest groups. By modeling politics in such a reduced-form fashion, we are
able to focus on the asset pricing implications of government policy changes.
Our modeling of government policies also merits some discussion. We impose the same
prior distribution in equation (3) on all policies. In reality, the priors might diﬀer across
policies. For example, if a potential new policy has already been tried in the past, the agents
may believe they have more prior information about that policy’s impact, so they might
assign a lower prior variance to it. The lower variance might not necessarily be warranted,
though, because the same policy implemented at a diﬀerent time in a diﬀerent environment
may have a diﬀerent impact on proﬁtability. Our assumption that all policies are perceived
by agents as identical ex ante seems like a natural starting point in an asset pricing analysis.
The simplicity of our setup allows us to derive interesting analytical results.
We interpret policy changes as government actions that change the economic landscape,
such as major reforms. Political uncertainty, σc, is the uncertainty about whether a reform
will take place. Policy uncertainty, σg, is the uncertainty about the eﬀect of the reform on
proﬁtability. We show below that both σc and σg aﬀect stock prices in interesting ways.
2.1. Learning
The value of gt is unknown to all agents, investors and the government alike. At time 0, all
agents share the same prior beliefs about gt, summarized by the distribution in equation (3).
All agents learn about gt in the same Bayesian fashion by observing the realized proﬁtabilities
of all ﬁrms. The learning process is described in the following proposition.
11Redistribution is a major theme in political economy. Prominent studies of redistribution include Alesina
and Rodrik(1994) and Persson and Tabellini(1994), amongothers. Our model is not well suited for analyzing
redistribution eﬀects because all of our investors are identical ex ante, for simplicity.
12See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Coate and Morris (1995).
13See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Rose-Ackerman (1999).
8Proposition 1. Observing the continuum of signals dΠi
t in equation (1) across all ﬁrms
i ∈ [0,1] is equivalent to observing a single aggregate signal about gt:
dst = (µ + gt)dt + σdZt. (7)








For all t ≤ τ, the mean and the variance of this posterior distribution evolve as













where the “expectation error” db Zt is given by db Zt = (dst − Et (dst))/σ for all t ∈ [0,T].
If there is no policy change at time τ, then the processes (9) and (10) hold also for t > τ.
If there is a policy change at τ, then b gt jumps from b gτ to zero right after the policy change,









σ2 (t − τ)
. (11)
Comparing equations (1) and (7), idiosyncratic shocks dZi
t wash out upon aggregating
inﬁnitely many independent signals. The aggregate signal in equation (7) is the average
proﬁtability across ﬁrms. When this signal is higher than expected, the agents revise their
beliefs about gt upward, and vice versa (see equation (9)). Uncertainty about gt declines
deterministicallyover time due to learning (see equations (10) and (11)), except for a discrete
jump up at time τ in case of a policy change. A policy change resets the agents’ beliefs about
gt from the posterior N (b gτ,b σ2





, where b στ < σg due to learning between
times 0 and τ. Before time τ, the agents learn about gold; after τ, they learn about gold or
gnew, depending on whether a policy change occurs (see equation (2)).
2.2. Optimal Changes in Government Policy
After a period of learning about gold, the government decides whether or not to change
its policy at time τ. If the change occurs, the value of gt changes from gold to gnew and
the perceived distribution of gt changes from the posterior in equation (8) to the prior in















| no policy change
￿
. (12)
9Since government policy aﬀects future proﬁtability, the two expectations in equation (12)











where g ≡ gold if there is no policy change and g ≡ gnew if there is one. Evaluating the
expectations in equation (12) based on equation (13) yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The government changes its policy at time τ if and only if





g − b σ2
τ
￿




(T − τ)(γ − 1)
. (15)
The government follows a simple cutoﬀ rule: it changes its policy if the posterior mean
of the old policy’s impact, b gτ, is below a given threshold. That is, a policy is replaced if
its eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁtability is perceived as suﬃciently unfavorable. The two terms on the
right-hand side of equation (15) reﬂect the government’s economic and political motives.
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the increase in risk associated with adopting a new policy (σg > b στ).
Since γ > 1, higher policy uncertainty σg reduces g(c), making a policy change less likely.
The second term reﬂects the political cost or beneﬁt incurred by the government if the new
policy is adopted. If c > 0, the government incurs a cost, the second component is negative,
and the new policy is less likely to be adopted. If c < 0, the government beneﬁts from a
policy change and the new policy is more likely to be adopted. Since the investors do not
know c, they cannot fully anticipate whether a policy change will occur. The only exception
occurs in the special case of σc = 0; in that case, the investors know the threshold g(c), so
they can fully predict the outcome of the government’s policy decision.
The investors expect c to be close to zero, so their expectation of g(c) is close to g(0).14
Since σg > b στ, equation (15) implies g(0) < 0. That is, in expectation, a policy is replaced
if its impact is perceived as suﬃciently negative. It is not enough for b gτ to be negative; it
must be suﬃciently negative for the expected gain from a policy change to outweigh the
higher risk associated with a new policy.15 For the posterior mean of gold to be negative at
14Recall from equation (6) that E(C) = 1 implies E(c) = −σ2
c/2 rather than zero for c = log(C).
15The political economy literature recognizes that uncertainty associated with a policy change may lead
to a bias toward status quo, but the literature focuses mostly on the uncertainty about how the gains and
losses from reform will be distributed across individuals (e.g., Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)). Our investors
are homogeneous; we focus on uncertainty about the aggregate eﬀects of a policy change.
10time τ while the prior mean is zero, Bayes’ rule implies that the signal received by investors
before time τ—realized proﬁtability—must be unexpectedly low. Therefore, Proposition 2
implies that policy changes are expected to occur after periods of unexpectedly low realized
proﬁtability.16 We refer to such periods as “downturns.”
To illustrate this implication, we plot the expected dynamics of proﬁtability conditional
on a policy change. We choose a set of plausible parameter values, which are summarized in
Table 1. We simulate many samples of shocks in our economy and record the paths of b gt and
realized proﬁtability in each sample. Realized proﬁtability is the average proﬁtability across
all ﬁrms, reported in excess of µ so that its unconditional mean is zero. We split the samples
into two groups, depending on whether the government changes its policy at time τ.17 We
then plot the average paths of b gt and realized proﬁtability across all samples within both
groups. Panel A of Figure 1 plots b gt (solid line) and proﬁtability (dashed line) conditional
on a policy change at time τ. Panel B plots the same quantities conditional on no policy
change. Both panels also plot the average value of the cutoﬀ g(c) (dotted line).
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that policy changes tend to be preceded by periods of low
realized proﬁtability. Between times 0 and τ = 10 years, proﬁtability averages -2.5% per
year. This negative proﬁtability is due to ex-post conditioning on b gτ < g(c). The average
value of g(c) is -0.5% per year, and the average value of b gt gradually falls from 0 to -1.5% per
year between times 0 and τ. For the posterior mean b gt to decline in this manner, realized
proﬁtability must be below b gt, as discussed earlier. When the policy changes at time τ, both
b gt and proﬁtability jump up to zero, on average, and stay there until time T = 20 since there
is no more ex-post conditioning after time τ.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the opposite but milder patterns when there is no policy
change. Due to ex-post conditioning on b gτ > g(c), the average value of b gt rises from 0 to
1% per year at time τ, and average realized proﬁtability is 1.5% until time τ. After time τ,
the average b gt remains unchanged at 1% because the policy remains the same. Proﬁtability
therefore jumps from 1.5% to 1% at time τ, and it stays there until time T.
Figure 2 shows how the expected dynamics of proﬁtability around policy changes depend
16Similar results have been obtained in the political economy literature by using diﬀerent mechanisms.
Rodrik (1996, p.27) writes: “Reform naturally becomes an issue only when current policies are perceived to
be not working.” According to Drazen (2000, p.449), “it is striking how little formal empirical testing there
has been of the view that a crisis is necessary for signiﬁcant policy change.” An early exception is Bruno and
Easterly (1996), who ﬁnd that inﬂation crises tend to be followed by reforms. Drazen and Easterly (2001)
and Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) also ﬁnd evidence supporting the hypothesis that crises induce
reforms, although the former study ﬁnds this evidence only for a subset of the crisis indicators.
17A policy change occurs in about 38% of all simulated samples.
11on policy uncertainty and political uncertainty. Each of the four panels is analogous to Panel
A of Figure 1. Whereas Figure 1 is constructed using the values from Table 1, σg = 2% and
σc = 10%, Figure 2 uses the values of σg = 1% and 3% per year, and σc = 0 and 20%.
Figure 2 shows that the downturns preceding policy changes tend to be worse when σg is
larger. Larger values of σg imply more negative expected values of g(c), which imply steeper
declines in b gt conditional on b gτ < g(c). To induce steeper declines in b gt, realized proﬁtability
must be more negative. For σg = 3%, realized proﬁtability before time τ is as low as -4% per
year. The eﬀect of σc is weaker. Changing σc from 0 to 20% has a negligible eﬀect on the
average value of g(c), which is close to g(0). The main eﬀect of σc is that when σc is higher,
large negative values of c are more likely, so a policy change is more likely to occur even if b gt
is high. For example, changing σc from 0 to 20% increases the likelihood of a policy change
from 46% to 50% when σg = 1%, and from 30% to 31% when σg = 3%. As a result, the
pre-τ declines in b gt and proﬁtability are less steep, on average.
Having established the government’s optimal policy rule and its key implications for
proﬁtability, we are ready to analyze the asset pricing implications. The following section
presents our main results on the stock price dynamics around policy changes.
3. Stock Prices
Firm i’s stock represents a claim on the ﬁrm’s liquidating dividend at time T, which is equal
to Bi
T. The investors’ total wealth at time T is equal to BT =
R 1
0 Bi
Tdi. Stock prices adjust
to make the investors hold all of the ﬁrms’ stock. In addition to stocks, there is also a zero
coupon bond in zero net supply, which makes a unit payoﬀ at time T with certainty. We
use this risk-free bond as the numeraire.18 Under the assumption of market completeness,











where λ is the Lagrange multiplier from the utility maximization problem of the represen-












18This assumption is equivalent to assuming a risk-free rate of zero. Such an assumption is innocuous
because without intermediate consumption, there is no intertemporal consumption choice that would pin
down the interest rate. This modeling choice ensures that interest rate ﬂuctuations do not drive our results.
123.1. Stock Price Reaction to the Announcement of a Policy Change
When the government announces its policy decision at time τ, stock prices jump. The
direction and size of the jump depend on whether the government decides to change or
maintain its policy, as well as on the extent to which this decision is unexpected. We derive
a closed-form solution for each ﬁrm’s “announcement return,” deﬁned as the instantaneous
stock return at time τ conditional on the announcement of a change in government policy.19
Proposition 3. Each ﬁrm’s stock return at the announcement of a policy change is given by
R(b gτ) =
(1 − p(b gτ))F (b gτ)(1 − G(b gτ))
p(b gτ) + (1 − p(b gτ))F (b gτ)G(b gτ)
, (18)
where












p(b gτ) = N
 





















and N(x;a,b) denotes the c.d.f. of a normal distribution with mean a and variance b.
The function in equation (21) is the probability of a policy change perceived by the
investors just before time τ. According to Proposition 2, p(b gτ) = Prob
￿
b gτ < g(c)
￿
. Since
the investors observe b gτ but not c, p(b gτ) can be expressed as the probability that c is
below a given threshold, implying equation (21). The rest of Proposition 3 follows from the
comparison of stock prices right before and right after the policy decision at time τ. Right





















τ if policy does not change
(22)
The values of the market-to-book (M/B) ratios, Mi
t/Bi
t, are equal across ﬁrms for all t
because all ﬁrms are identical ex ante. We show that right before time τ, the market value





τ+ + (1 − ω)M
i,no
τ+ , (23)
where the weight ω, which is always between 0 and 1, is given by
ω =
pτ
pτ + (1 − pτ)F (b gτ)
, (24)
19The stock return conditional on the announcement of no change in policy is analyzed in Section 3.2.
13using the abbreviated notation pτ ≡ p(b gτ). As one would expect, ω increases with pτ, with
pτ → 0 implying ω → 0 and pτ → 1 implying ω → 1. The announcement return R(b gτ) in







− 1 . (25)
To gain some intuitive insight into the announcement return R(b gτ), recall that a policy
change replaces a policy whose impact is perceived to be distributed as N(b gτ,b σ2
τ) by a policy
whose impact is perceived as N(0,σ2
g). Relative to the old policy, the new policy typically
increases the ﬁrms’ expected future cash ﬂows (because b gτ must be below a threshold that
is typically negative).20 However, the new policy also increases the discount rates due to its
higher uncertainty (because σg > b στ due to learning). The cash ﬂow eﬀect pushes stock prices
up, whereas the discount rate eﬀect pushes them down. Either eﬀect can win, depending on
b gτ and the parameter values. The following two corollaries describe the behavior of R(b gτ)
when risk aversion γ > 1 takes extreme values.
Corollary 1. As risk aversion γ → ∞, the announcement return R(b gτ) → −1 for any b gτ.
Corollary 2. As risk aversion γ → 1, the expected value of the announcement return goes
to zero (E{R(b gτ)} → 0), where the expectation is computed with respect to b gτ as of time 0.
Both corollaries follow quickly from Proposition 3. When γ → ∞, the discount rate eﬀect
discussed above dwarfs the cash ﬂow eﬀect and stocks lose all of their value when the more
uncertain policy is installed. In this limiting case, the probability of a policy change goes
to zero. By continuity, Corollary 1 implies that if risk aversion is large, policy changes are
unlikely but if they do occur, stock prices fall dramatically. When γ → 1, the discount rate
eﬀect and the cash ﬂow eﬀect cancel out, on average.
3.1.1. When is the Announcement Return Negative?
In this subsection, we derive the conditions under which the announcement return R(b gτ) < 0.
Proposition 4. The market value of each ﬁrm drops at the announcement of a policy change
(i.e., R(b gτ) < 0) if and only if
b gτ > g
∗ , (26)
20To clarify the word “typically,”exceptions occur if the government derives an unexpectedly large political
beneﬁt from changing its policy. If c is suﬃciently negative, the cutoﬀ g(c) in equation (15) can be positive,


















Proposition 4 shows that stock prices drop at the announcement of a new policy unless
the old policy is perceived as having a suﬃciently negative impact on proﬁtability. The
relative importance of the cash ﬂow and discount rate eﬀects depends on b gτ. Under (26),
the discount rate eﬀect is stronger and the announcement return is negative. Formally, (26)
implies G(b gτ) > 1, resulting in R(b gτ) < 0 (see equations (18) and (20)).
Combining the results in Propositions 2 and 4, stock prices drop at the announcement of
a policy change if and only if
g
∗ < b gτ < g(c) . (28)
That is, b gτ must be suﬃciently low for the policy change to occur (Proposition 2), but it must
be suﬃciently high for the discount rate eﬀect to overcome the cash ﬂow eﬀect (Proposition

















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (29) is expected to be close to zero. The
second term is always positive, so g(c) − g∗ is generally positive, and its magnitude (and
thus also the size of the interval for which the condition (28) holds) increases with σg.
Since g∗ in equation (27) can also be expressed as g∗ = g(0) −
￿
σ2
g − b σ2
τ
￿
(T − τ)γ/2, we
have g∗ < g(0) < 0. Figure 3 illustrates four possible locations of b gτ relative to g∗, g(0),
and zero. Also plotted is the distribution of g(c), as perceived by investors (who do not
observe c) just before time τ. This normal distribution is centered at a value just above g(0)
(see equations (6) and (15)). This distribution, along with the values of g∗ and g(0), are
computed based on the parameters in Table 1. The shaded area represents the probability
of a policy change, as perceived by the investors just before time τ.
In Panel A of Figure 3, b gτ is very low, and the probability of a policy change is nearly
one. Since b gτ < g∗, stock prices rise at the announcement of a policy change. Given the high
probability of such a change, the price increase will be small because most of it is already
priced in. In contrast, stock prices plunge in the unlikely event of no policy change, which
occurs if such a change imposes a very large political cost on the government.
In Panels B through D, b gτ > g∗, so stock prices fall if the policy is changed. In Panel
B, g∗ < b gτ < g(0), and the policy change reduces stock prices even though it increases
15the investors’ expected utility. Stock prices are lower due to higher discount rates, but the
expected utility is higher due to higher expected wealth. Expected utility and stock prices
need not move in the same direction because stock prices are related to marginal utility
rather than the level of utility. In Panel D, b gτ > 0, indicating that the prevailing policy is
boosting proﬁtability. The probability of a policy change is then small, but should such a
change occur (if c << 0), the stock price reaction will be strongly negative. If the government
derives an unexpectedly large political beneﬁt from changing its policy, it replaces even a
policy that appears to work well, and stock prices exhibit a large drop as a result.
Figure 3 captures uncertainty about c while conditioning on b gτ. Such a perspective is
relevant at time τ when b gτ is known, but less so before time τ while b gτ is uncertain. As of
time 0, the perceived distribution of b gτ is N(0,σ2
g−b σ2
τ). Therefore, the values of b gτ considered
in Panel A of Figure 3, for which stock prices rise at the announcement of a policy change,
are less likely than those in Panels B through D, for which stock prices fall. The distribution
of R(b gτ) that is relevant from the perspective of an econometrician (or an investor at time 0)
must incorporate uncertainty about both c and b gτ. We integrate out all of that uncertainty
in computing the expected value of R(b gτ) in the following subsection.
3.1.2. The Expected Announcement Return (EAR)
We deﬁne the expected announcement return (EAR) as the expected value of R(b gτ) after
integrating out all uncertainty about c and b gτ as of time 0 and conditioning on b gτ < g(c):
EAR ≡ E{R(b gτ)|Policy Change} . (30)
Note that EAR is the return that we expect to see at the announcement of a policy change—
the expected value of the return at time τ conditional on a policy change at the same time
τ. Given the conditioning on a contemporaneous event, EAR does not represent the more
traditional expectation of a future return based on information available today. (The latter
expected returns are analyzed in Section 3.2.) Instead, EAR is the expected return relevant
from an event study perspective. The following proposition presents our main result.
Proposition 5. The expected announcement return is negative (EAR < 0).
According to Proposition 5, stock prices are expected to fall at the announcement of
a policy change. This result relies on the government’s quasi-benevolence. Since the gov-
ernment is expected to maximize the investors’ welfare, the government’s value-enhancing
policy decisions are mostly expected by the market participants. Positive announcement
16returns tend to occur when the policy change is widely anticipated (b gτ < g∗, see Panel A of
Figure 3). The positive eﬀect of the policy change is thus largely priced in before the an-
nouncement, resulting in a weak price reaction to the announcement. In contrast, negative
announcement returns occur when the policy change comes as a bigger surprise (Panels B
through D), so the price reaction is stronger. In short, the positive returns tend to be small
and the negative returns tend to be large. In addition, the negative announcement returns
are fairly likely since even some utility-increasing policy changes reduce market values, as
explained earlier while discussing Panel B of Figure 3.
To understand Proposition 5, it also helps to realize that when investors observe a policy
change, they revise their beliefs about the political cost C. Before time τ, they expect C
to be one (see equation (6)), but conditional on a policy change at time τ, the expectation
drops below one: E(C|policy change) < E(C) = 1. This fact follows from the condition
(14) for the optimality of a policy change, which can be rewritten as c < ξ(b gτ), where ξ(b gτ)
is a decreasing function of b gτ. (The expected value of c conditional on c < ξ(b gτ) is less
than the unconditional expected value of c.) As a result, investors expect the government to
derive a political beneﬁt from any policy change. Even though C does not aﬀect stock prices
directly, it adds noise to the policy decision. Observing a policy change, investors infer that
the increase in risk is certain but the increase in cash ﬂows is not, and stock prices typically
fall. They fall more when b gτ is higher because the policy change is then more likely to be
politically motivated. After integrating b gτ out, we prove that EAR< 0.
The magnitude of EAR depends on uncertainty about government policy. We relate EAR
to σg and σc in Figure 4. We compute EAR by averaging the announcement returns R(b gτ)
across all simulated paths for which a policy change occurs at time τ. The parameter values
are from Table 1, as before, except that we vary σg and σc.
Figure 4 shows that EAR is more negative for larger values of σg and σc. Fixing σc = 20%,
EAR is only -0.3% for σg = 1% but -2% for σg = 3%. When σg is larger, so is the risk
associated with a new policy, and so is the discount rate eﬀect that pushes stock prices
down. Fixing σg = 2%, EAR is -0.5% for σc = 10% and -1.1% for σc = 20%. When σc is
larger, so is the element of surprise in the announcement of a new policy. Also note that
when either uncertainty is zero, so is the announcement return. When σc = 0, the policy
change is fully anticipated, and all of its eﬀect is priced in before the announcement. When
σg = 0, one neutral policy is replaced by another, making no diﬀerence to investors.
173.1.3. The Determinants of the Announcement Return
In this subsection, we analyze two key determinants of the announcement return R(b gτ) from
equation (18): the length and depth of the downturns that precede policy changes. Recall
that a downturn is deﬁned as a period of unexpectedly low realized proﬁtability. We vary
the downturns’ length and depth in a simple way. We measure the length of a downturn as
LENGTH = τ − t0 , (31)
where we set b gt0 = 0. At time t0, the posterior mean of the policy impact is then equal
to the prior mean, but after t0, b gt generally falls, conditional on a policy change at time τ
(Proposition 2). We refer to t0 as the beginning of a downturn.
We measure the depth of a downturn by the number of standard deviations by which b gt
drops during the downturn. Conditional on b gt0 = 0, the distribution of b gτ is normal with
mean zero and standard deviation Std(b gτ) =
p
b σ2






Panel A of Figure 5 plots the announcement return as a function of LENGTH and
DEPTH. Panel B plots the corresponding probability of a policy change, as perceived by
investors just before time τ (cf. Figure 3). Whenever this probability is close to one, the
announcement return is close to zero because the announcement is already priced in. When
the probability is smaller than one, a policy change contains an element of surprise, and the
announcement return is nonzero. The parameter values are from Table 1, as before.
Figure 5 shows that DEPTH has a large eﬀect on the announcement return. When the
downturn is shallow (i.e., DEPTH is not a large negative value), the announcement return
is negative. This result makes sense given Proposition 4, since DEPTH is proportional to
b gτ. The magnitude of the announcement return can be as large as -10% if the downturn
is suﬃciently shallow. Even larger returns can happen if c << 0, i.e., if the government
derives a huge political beneﬁt from changing its policy. In contrast, when the downturn
is suﬃciently deep, the announcement return is essentially zero. The return is positive
(Proposition 4), but it is small because the policy change is fully anticipated (Panel B).
The announcement return also depends on LENGTH. Figure 5 shows that shorter down-
turns are followed by more negative announcement returns, holding DEPTH at a constant
negative value. The reason is that as LENGTH increases, so does Std(b gτ) in equation (32),
18so does the negative magnitude of b gτ required to keep DEPTH constant, and so does the
probability of a policy change, resulting in a smaller element of surprise in the announcement
of such a change. (This eﬀect reverses when DEPTH is positive because higher LENGTH
then implies a higher positive magnitude of b gτ and thus a lower probability of a policy
change.) Put diﬀerently, shorter downturns are less likely to induce a policy change, so if
such a change occurs, it comes as a bigger surprise. It is also more likely to be politically
motivated, resulting in a more negative announcement return.
The announcement returns in Figure 5 are nonpositive, but they can be positive for
other parameter values. Recall from equation (29) that the size of the interval for which
prices drop at the announcement increases with σg. If σg is small, so is the interval, and
positive announcement returns are more likely. To see this eﬀect, consider Figure 6, which is
analogous to Figure 5, except that the baseline value σg = 2% is replaced by σg = 1% (left
panels) and σg = 3% (right panels). The patterns for σg = 3% are similar to those in Figure
5 but more pronounced; the announcement return can be -20% after a shallow downturn.
However, for σg = 1%, the announcement return can be positive for downturns that are
neither too short nor too shallow. These positive returns are small, less than 0.5%. Slightly
larger positive announcement returns obtain when we raise σc from 10% to 20%, but even
those returns are smaller than 1% (results are not shown to save space).
Figures 5 and 6 show that shorter downturns are followed by more negative announcement
returns when we hold DEPTH ﬁxed at a constant negative value. The same result holds in
expectation when we integrate out uncertainty about DEPTH. Figure 7 is the counterpart of
Figure 4: it plots EAR for two diﬀerent LENGTHs: 5 years in Panel A and 1 year in Panel
B. (In Figure 4, LENGTH = 10 years.) Figure 7 shows that EAR grows more negative as
LENGTH shortens. For example, in the benchmark case from Table 1, in which σg = 2%
and σc = 10%, EAR goes from -0.5% for LENGTH = 10 (Figure 4) to -1% for LENGTH = 5
to -4% for LENGTH = 1 (Figure 7). The eﬀect of LENGTH is even stronger when there is
more government-induced uncertainty: when σg = 3% and σc = 20%, EAR goes from -2%
for LENGTH = 10 to -4.6% for LENGTH = 5 to -18% for LENGTH = 1.
3.1.4. The Distribution of Stock Returns on the Announcement Day
In this subsection, we examine the probability distribution of stock returns on the day of
the announcement of a policy change, without conditioning on DEPTH. This distribution
is relevant from the empirical perspective if the event study of the announcement eﬀects is
19conducted on daily returns, which is commonly done.21 The announcement day returns have
a jump component R(b gτ) pertaining to the instant of the announcement, as well as a diﬀusion
component Mτ+day/Mτ − 1 covering the rest of the announcement day. Figure 8 plots the
distribution of the announcement day returns across all simulated paths for which a policy
change occurs at time τ. The randomness in the simulations comes from the randomness in
b gτ and c. The downturn length is 5 years. The parameter values are from Table 1, as before,
except that we vary σg and σc.
Figure 8 shows that the distribution of the announcement day returns is strongly left-
skewed. The mode is close to zero, returns larger than 2% are extremely rare, whereas
returns below -5% and even -10% are more common, especially when σg and σc are large.
This skewness is due to the asymmetry discussed earlier. Positive announcement returns
tend to occur when the policy change is widely anticipated, whereas negative returns occur
when the policy change comes as a bigger surprise. We also see that as we increase σg or
σc, the probability mass in Figure 8 shifts to the left, consistent with our earlier result that
EAR is more negative when σg or σc are larger.
3.2. Stock Price Dynamics
The dynamics of stock prices are closely related to the dynamics of the stochastic discount
factor from equation (16), which are described by the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The stochastic discount factor (SDF) follows the process
dπt
πt
= −σπ,tdb Zt + Jπ1{t=τ} , (33)
where db Zt is the Brownian motion from Proposition 1, 1{t=τ} is an indicator function equal










pτ+(1−pτ)F(b gτ) if policy does not change .
(34)
For t > τ, σπ,t is given by
σπ,t = γ
￿





21For example, Savor and Wilson (2010) use daily returns to analyze the announcement eﬀects of macroe-
conomic news announcements regarding employment, inﬂation, and interest rates. If the event study is
conducted on tick-by-tick returns instead, the distribution of the instantaneous return R(b gτ) would be more
relevant. That distribution is similar to the distribution of the announcement day returns plotted here,
except that it looks even more left-skewed and it has less probability mass above zero.
20and for t ≤ τ, it is given in equation (A2) in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 shows that SDF jumps at time τ when the policy decision is announced.
The magnitude of the jump depends on whether the policy is changed as well as on b gτ. The
jumps Jyes
π and Jno
π always have the opposite signs. The expected value of the jump, as
perceived just before time τ, is zero: Eτ (Jπ) = pτJyes
π + (1 − pτ)Jno
π = 0. It is also easy to
show that Jyes
π < 0 (and Jno



















= µM,tdt + σM,tdb Zt + σ1dZ
i
t + JM1{t=τ} , (37)





M = R(b gτ) if policy changes
Jno
M = R(b gτ)G(b gτ) + G(b gτ) − 1 if policy does not change .
(38)
For t > τ, we have
µM,t = γ
￿








and for t ≤ τ, σM,t and µM,t are given in equations (A4) and (A5) in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that stock returns have two components: a diﬀusion component and
a jump component. We discuss these components in separate subsections.
3.3. Stock Price Jump at the Announcement of a Policy Decision
Stock prices jump at time τ when the government announces its policy decision. If the
decision is to change the prevailing policy, the jump J
yes
M is equal to R(b gτ), which is given
in equation (18) and analyzed extensively in Section 3.1. If the decision is not to change the
policy, the jump Jno
M in equation (38) involves also the function G(b gτ) from equation (20).
Corollary 3. The market value of each ﬁrm increases at the announcement of no policy
change (i.e., Jno
M > 0) if and only if b gτ > g∗, where g∗ is given in equation (27).




have the opposite signs: whenever one is positive, the other is negative. When b gτ > g∗, we
have J
yes
M < 0 and Jno
M > 0. When b gτ < g∗, we have J
yes
M > 0 and Jno
M < 0.
In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on the expected value of JM, or the expected
jump in stock prices at the announcement of a policy decision. This expectation captures the
risk premium that investors demand for facing jumps in SDF at time τ. We consider both
conditional and unconditional expectations. The conditional expectation of JM, denoted by
Eτ (JM), is perceived by agents just before time τ:
Eτ (JM) = pτJ
yes
M + (1 − pτ)J
no
M . (41)
This conditional expectation conditions on b gτ, which is observable just before the policy
decision. We also compute the unconditional expectation E(JM) = E(Eτ (JM)) by integrat-
ing out uncertainty about b gτ as of time 0. (Recall that b gτ ∼ N
￿
0,σ2




expectation matters to an econometrician who averages jumps in stock prices across all an-
nouncements of policy decisions, without controlling for b gτ. Neither expectation conditions
on whether the decision changes the policy or not, so that both Eτ (JM) and E(JM) can be
viewed as expected returns (or risk premia) in the traditional forward-looking sense.
3.3.1. The Conditional Jump Risk Premium
Proposition 8. The conditional expected jump in stock prices at time τ, as perceived by
investors just before time τ, is given by
Eτ (JM) = −
pτ (1 − pτ)(1 − F (b gτ))(1 − G(b gτ))
pτ + (1 − pτ)F (b gτ)G(b gτ)
. (42)
Corollary 4. We have Eτ (JM) < 0 if and only if
g
∗ < b gτ < g
∗∗ , (43)
where g∗ is given in equation (27) and g∗∗ is given in equation (36).
Corollary 4 shows that Eτ (JM) can be positive or negative, depending on b gτ.22 This
expected jump, which captures the jump risk premium, is related to the covariance between
the jumps in prices and SDF, as perceived by the agents just before the policy decision:
Eτ (JM) = −Covτ (Jπ,JM) , (44)
22The size of the interval in (43) is always positive because g∗∗ − g∗ = −g(0) > 0.
22where Jπ is given in equation (34). The sign of this covariance depends on whether (43) is
satisﬁed. If the covariance is positive, upward jumps in marginal utility at time τ tend to be
accompanied by upward jumps in stock prices, which makes stocks an eﬀective hedge against
jumps in SDF. As a result, investors are willing to accept a negative jump risk premium for
holding stocks (i.e., Eτ (JM) < 0). In contrast, if the covariance is negative, stocks are a
poor hedge against jumps in marginal utility and the jump risk premium is positive.
Corollary 5. As risk aversion γ → ∞, Eτ (JM) → 0 from above for any value of b gτ.
Corollary 6. As risk aversion γ → 1, Eτ (JM) converges to a nonnegative value for any b gτ.
It converges to zero if and only if b gτ = −
1
2 (T − τ)
￿
σ2




As γ → ∞, the probability of a policy change goes to zero. Given the diminishing element
of surprise in the policy decision, the jump risk premium diminishes as well. In contrast, the
jump risk premium remains positive almost surely as γ → 1.
3.3.2. The Unconditional Jump Risk Premium
The expectation E(JM), which does not condition on b gτ, represents the unconditional jump
risk premium. As noted earlier, E(JM) is the expected value of the quantity in Proposition
8, where the expectation is taken with respect to b gτ as of time 0.
Corollary 7. As risk aversion γ → ∞, E(JM) → 0 from above.
Corollary 8. As risk aversion γ → 1, E(JM) converges to a positive value.
According to Corollaries 7 and 8, there exist values γ and γ exceeding one such that
E(JM) > 0 for every γ ∈ (1,γ) as well as for every γ ∈ (γ,∞). In fact, E(JM) > 0 appears
to hold for any value of γ. While we are unable to prove E(JM) > 0 in its full generality (the
analytical challenges are formidable), our numerical investigation supports this statement.
Having evaluated E(JM) on a large multidimensional grid of parameter values, we have not
found any set of parameters for which E(JM) > 0 is violated. This result is not surprising
because the condition (43) is unlikely to hold (since g∗ < g∗∗ < g(0) < 0, b g0 = 0, and b gt is
a martingale). We thus conclude that our model implies a positive unconditional premium
for the jump risk associated with the announcements of policy decisions.
Panel A of Figure 9 plots E(JM) as a function of σg and σc for the parameter values
from Table 1. We set the downturn length to 5 years, so that uncertainty about b gτ is
23integrated out as of time t0 = 5 conditional on b gt0 = 0. The ﬁgure shows that the jump
risk premium E(JM) increases with both σg and σc. In the benchmark case of σg = 2% and
σc = 10%, E(JM) = 5 basis points; for σg = 3%, it is 10 basis points. These magnitudes
are comparable to the 9.6 basis point jump risk premium estimated by Savor and Wilson
(2010). These authors ﬁnd that stock market returns tend to be higher on days when news
about inﬂation, unemployment, or interest rates is announced. We focus on a diﬀerent kind
of announcements, those of government policy decisions, so Savor and Wilson’s estimates are
not directly comparable to the magnitudes in our Figure 9. Nonetheless, it seems interesting
that the magnitude of the jump risk premium produced by our model is similar to the jump
risk premium estimated empirically for a diﬀerent kind of market-wide announcements.
Panels B and C of Figure 9 plot the unconditional expected jumps E(J
yes
M ) and E(Jno
M ),
which are computed analogously to E(JM) by integrating out uncertainty about b gτ. Panel
B, showing E(J
yes
M ), coincides with Panel A of Figure 7; it is included for symmetry. Panel C
of Figure 9 shows that E(Jno
M ) is positive and increasing in both σg and σc, but its magnitude
is much smaller than that of E(J
yes
M ). The reason is that the probability-weighted average of
the jumps in Panels B and C is close to zero (see Panel A) and the unconditional probability
of a policy change is less than 0.5. This probability, which is assessed at the beginning of
the downturn, ranges from 11% to 49%, depending on the values of σg and σc (it is 29% in
the benchmark case of σg = 2% and σc = 10%).
3.4. The Diﬀusion Component of Stock Returns
Whereas the jump components are nonzero only at time τ, the diﬀusion components in
equations (33) and (37) drive the dynamics of returns and SDF for all t ∈ (0,T). Both
components are aﬀected by uncertainty about government policy. The jump component is
driven by the resolution of political uncertainty, whereas the diﬀusion component is driven by
policy uncertainty. Equations (35), (39), and (40) show that policy uncertainty increases the
volatility of SDF as well as the mean and variance of stock returns. After time τ, σπ,t, µM,t,
and σM,t all vary over time as increasing functions of b σt. Similar dependence on uncertainty
about gt is present before time τ. If the policy change occurs at time τ, uncertainty about
gt jumps up (since σg > b στ), causing upward jumps in σπ,t, µM,t, and σM,t.
Figure 10 plots the expected dynamics of σπ,t, µM,t and σM,t around a policy change. We
simulate many samples of shocks in the model, maintaining b gt0 = 0 for t0 = 5 to keep the
downturn length at 5 years. (The results for downturn lengths of 1 and 10 years look very
24similar.) We plot the paths of σπ,t, µM,t and σM,t averaged across the subset of samples in
which a policy change occurs in year τ = 10. The parameters are from Table 1, except for
σg, which takes three diﬀerent values, 1%, 2%, and 3% per year.
Figure 10 is dominated by the upward jumps in σπ,t, µM,t and σM,t at the time of a policy
change. These jumps are induced by increases in uncertainty about gt, as discussed earlier.
For example, for σg = 2%, σπ,t jumps from 28% to 65% per year, µM,t jumps from 2% to 9%
per year, and σM,t jumps from 12% to 16% per year. The magnitudes of all three quantities
increase in σg: when σg = 3%, both µM,t and σM,t jump to about 25% per year. After time
τ, all quantities gradually fall as a result of the learning-induced gradual decline in b σt.
Stock returns before time τ are aﬀected by multiple forces. Let pt denote the probability
of a policy change at time τ, as perceived by investors at time t < τ. Fluctuations in pt
contribute to volatility: stock prices ﬂuctuate as investors change their minds about what the
government is going to do. Conditional on a policy change, pt grows towards pτ = 1, and the
volatility induced by ﬂuctuations in pt typically increases as time τ approaches. There are
also two opposite eﬀects. First, b σt declines over time due to learning, thereby pushing σπ,t,
µM,t, and σM,t down. Second, when pt increases, the current value of gt becomes less likely
to matter after time τ, making stock prices less sensitive to b gt. The rising probability of a
policy change makes the current policy less relevant, reducing the sensitivity of stock prices
to time-varying beliefs about this policy. Which of these eﬀects prevails depends on the
parameter values. In Figure 10, all three quantities fall before τ, suggesting that the eﬀect
of growing ﬂuctuations in the probability of a policy change is weaker than the combined
eﬀects of learning and the diminished sensitivity of prices to b gt.23
Corollary 9. The correlation between the returns of any pair of stocks for t > τ is given by
ρt =
[σ + (T − t)b σ2
tσ−1]
2





For t < τ, the correlation is given in equation (A6) in the Appendix.
For t = τ, the instantaneous correlation is one.
Equation (45) shows that after time τ, the correlation ρt increases with b σt. Intuitively,
uncertainty about gt increases each stock’s sensitivity to the common factor b gt, thereby
making returns more correlated. Similar dependence of ρt on b σt is present also before time
23In unreported results for LENGTH=1 year, both µM,t and σM,t fall before τ when σg = 1% and 2%, but
they rise when σg = 3%. In the latter case, the eﬀect of growing ﬂuctuations in the probability of a policy
change prevails over the combined eﬀects of learning and the diminished sensitivity of stock prices to b gt.
25τ, when ρt depends also on the probability of a policy change. At time τ, ρt = 1 due to the
resolution of political uncertainty, which results in a common jump in stock prices.
Panel D of Figure 10 plots the expected dynamics of ρt around a policy change at time
τ = 10. The correlation jumps up at time τ, for reasons discussed earlier. This jump is
substantial: from 30% to 62% when σg = 2%, and from 39% to 84% when σg = 3%. (We do
not plot the instantaneous jump in ρt to one at time τ.) After time τ, the correlation falls
due to learning. Before time τ, the correlation falls due to the previously-discussed eﬀects
of learning and the diminished price sensitivity to b gt.
Figure 11 is equivalent to Figure 10, except that it focuses on policy decisions that result
in no policy change. That is, we plot the paths of σπ,t, µM,t, σM,t, and ρt averaged across the
subset of simulated samples in which no policy change occurs at time τ. Unlike in Figure
10, all four quantities drop at τ for σg = 2% and 3%. The main reason behind the drop is
the resolution of political uncertainty at τ. As noted earlier, ﬂuctuations in pt contribute to
stock price volatility before τ. Once the government makes its decision, pt stops ﬂuctuating
and this component of volatility disappears. Under no policy change, there is no opposing
increase in uncertainty about gt (unlike in Figure 10), so the four quantities drop.
The only exception occurs for σg = 1%, for which the four quantities rise slightly at τ. In
this case, the resolution of political uncertainty is outweighed by the increase in stock price
sensitivity to b gt after time τ. When σg is small, both b gt and the threshold g(c) are expected
to be close to zero before τ, so that pt is typically nontrivial for t < τ even in those samples
in which no policy change occurs at τ. The nontrivial probability of a policy change reduces
the pre-τ sensitivity of stock prices to b gt, as discussed earlier. This reduction in sensitivity
is more pronounced on the downside: when b gt falls, pt increases, raising the probability that
the current gt will not matter after τ and thereby cushioning the stock price drop. However,
once pt jumps to zero at τ, the price sensitivity to b gt increases, pushing volatility up.
3.5. Price Dynamics When Policy Changes Are Precluded
In this subsection, we compare the model-implied stock prices with their counterparts in
the hypothetical scenario in which policy changes are precluded. This scenario matches our
model in all respects except that the government cannot change its policy at time τ (and
investors know that). First, we compare the aggregate stock market values at time 0, M0,
given the parameter values from Table 1. We ﬁnd that M0 is smaller when policy changes
26are precluded: 2.81 vs 3.25.24 However, this result is not general—while it holds for σg = 3%
as well, it reverses for σg = 1% (4.81 vs 4.67). Second, we conduct similar comparisons while
varying the time remaining until the policy decision. We ﬁnd that if the policy decision is
close enough (eight years or less), the threat of systematic risk going up in the event of a
policy change reduces stock prices relative to the hypothetical scenario, even for σg = 2%.25
The government’s ability to change its policy can thus increase or decrease market values,
depending on the parameter values and the time remaining until the policy decision.
We also compare the expected dynamics of Mt when policy changes are allowed versus
when they are precluded, while conditioning on (14) and the parameters from Table 1. That
is, we compare the values of Mt averaged across the subsample of all simulations in which
a policy change occurs in our model. These average values are plotted in Panels A and
B of Figure 12. Panel A conditions on the downturn length of one year, whereas Panel
B conditions on ﬁve years. In both panels, Mt falls before time τ whether policy changes
are allowed or precluded, due to the ex-post conditioning on (14). (Declines in b gτ tend to
be accompanied by declines in stock prices.) In addition, the average stock price drop at
time τ is clearly visible. Interestingly, in Panel B, Mt around time τ is mostly higher when
policy changes are allowed, but in Panel A, Mt is higher when policy changes are precluded.
That is, the government’s ability to change its policy reduces market values during short
downturns. In both panels, this ability ampliﬁes the stock price decline before time τ.
Panels C and D of Figure 12 plot the expected dynamics of market volatility, σM,t,
conditional on (14). In both panels, after time τ, volatility is higher when policy changes
are allowed. Before time τ, though, the ability to change the policy can increase or decrease
volatility compared to the hypothetical scenario: increase when the downturn lasts one year
(Panel C), but decrease when it lasts ﬁve years (Panel D). On the one hand, the ability to
change the current policy decreases pre-τ volatility by reducing the sensitivity of stock prices
to news about the impact of the current policy. On the other hand, this ability increases
pre-τ volatility by introducing ﬂuctuations in the agents’ assessment of the probability of a
policy change. The latter force prevails in Panel C, while the former prevails in Panel D.
Overall, we conclude that the government’s ability to change its policy substantially aﬀects
the level and volatility of stock prices.
24Market values are measured in units of book value at time 0. Recall that we set Bi
0 = 1 for all i.
25The results are available upon request. We do not plot them here to save space.
274. Extension: Endogenous Timing of Policy Change
Our benchmark model assumes that the government can change its policy only at a given
time τ. This assumption buys us closed-form solutions for many quantities of interest, and
it allows us to formally prove our propositions and corollaries. In this section, we extend
the model by endogenizing the timing of the policy change. No closed-form solutions are
available but we can solve the problem numerically. To give a preview, we ﬁnd that our
main results continue to hold in this setting. In addition, we ﬁnd that policy changes that
happen earlier tend to produce more negative announcement returns.
We assume that the government can change its policy at any time τ ∈ [τ1,τ2,...,τn],
where τi = i and n = 19, so the policy change can occur in any year (T = 20). Once the
change is made, it is irreversible. At each time τi, a new value of the political cost Ci is
drawn from the distribution in equation (6). The values of Ci are iid. After observing Ci, the
government decides whether to change its policy, maximizing the same objective as before.
Let V (b gt,Bt,t) denote the value function given no policy change at or before time t:























This value represents a solution to a partial diﬀerential equation, with the ﬁnal condition
V (b gT,BT,T) = B
1−γ
T /(1 − γ), as detailed in the Appendix. Conditional on a policy change








2 (T−τ) . (47)
The government changes its policy at time τ = τi if and only if
V (Bτi,τi,c) > V (b gτ,Bτi,τi) . (48)
Figure 13 shows that our key results continue to hold when τ is endogenous. For the
parameter values from Table 1, Panel A plots EAR as a function of σg and σc. This panel
is analogous to Figure 4, in which τ is exogenous. As in Figure 4, EAR is negative and
its magnitude is increasing in both σg and σc. The magnitudes are generally larger than
in Figure 4: for example, in the benchmark case with σg = 2% and σc = 10%, EAR is
-1.9%, compared to -0.5% in Figure 4. The reason why the magnitudes are larger when τ
is endogenous is diﬃcult to convey precisely because the results are obtained numerically.
However, some intuition emerges when we consider Propositions 2 and 4, which apply when τ
28is exogenous. These propositions imply that a policy change occurs at time τ if b gτ < g(c), and
that stock prices drop at the announcement if g∗ < b gτ < g(c). Under the bold assumption
that these results are approximately relevant also when τ is endogenous, the policy change
will occur at time τi if b gτi < g(ci) but b gτi−1 > g(ci−1). Since b gt has only just fallen below the
threshold at time τi (but not at time τi−1), it seems unlikely that b gτi is so low that it is also
below g∗, in which case the announcement return would be positive. This intuition is only
approximate, not only because Propositions 2 and 4 rely on exogenous τ but also because
the threshold g(ci) is time-varying due to time variation in ci. Nonetheless, it is comforting
to see that our main result holds and even strengthens when we endogenize τ.
Panel B of Figure 13 plots the same quantity as Panel A, the expected announcement
return conditional on a policy change, but this time as a function of the time τ at which
the policy is changed. Recall that τ is optimally chosen by the government from the set
τ ∈ [1,2,...,19]. Whereas Panel A averages the announcement returns across all τ, Panel B
averages them only across those simulations in which the policy change occurs at the given
τ. We keep σc = 10% as in Table 1 and vary σg.26 There are two basic results: (i) the
announcement return is negative for all τ, and (ii) its magnitude is larger when τ is smaller.
For example, holding σg at 2%, the announcement return is -1% for τ = 15 but almost -5%
for τ = 5.27 This result is easy to understand. At each point in time, the government weighs
the costs and beneﬁts of changing the policy. One important cost is that the irreversible
policy change destroys the option to wait (e.g., the political beneﬁt from changing the policy
might be higher in the future). This option value of waiting declines as time passes. Early
on, while this option value is still high, it takes a large political beneﬁt for the policy change
to occur. As a result, policy changes occurring at low τi’s tend to be politically motivated
and highly unexpected, producing larger negative announcement returns.
Panels C and D of Figure 13 plot the expected dynamics of σM,t and ρt, respectively,
around a policy change. These dynamics are computed by averaging across those simulated
paths in which a policy change occurs at any τ ∈ [1,2,...,19]. The results are plotted
in event time, with time 0 marking the policy change (time τ). Panels C and D are the
counterparts of the same panels in Figure 10 for an exogenously given τ. As in Figure 10,
both volatility and correlation jump up at the time of a policy change and decline afterwards.
The magnitudes of these eﬀects are almost as large as those in Figure 10.
26We vary σg because the eﬀect of σc is predictable and weaker than the eﬀect of σg.
27The magnitudes are even more negative for τ < 5 but the simulation results then become less precise
due to the small probability of policy changes for small values of τ. To keep the number of simulations
manageable and the plot smooth rather than jagged, we do not plot the announcement returns for τ < 5.
29Finally, we examine the expected dynamics of proﬁtability and b gt around a policy change.
In unreported results, we ﬁnd that both proﬁtability and b gt decline before the policy change.
This pattern indicates that policy changes tend to occur after downturns, as they do when
τ is exogenous (cf. Panel A of Figure 1). To summarize, all of our key results remain
unchanged when τ is endogenous.
5. Extension: Investment Adjustment
In the benchmark model analyzed in Sections 2. and 3., the ﬁrms’ decision-making is not
modeled explicitly. Any investment decisions taken by ﬁrms are assumed to be reﬂected
in the proﬁtability process in equation (1). This process might not adequately capture all
investmentdecisions. For example, prompted by policy uncertainty, a ﬁrm might disinvest by
shutting down its operations, making the process (1) obsolete. In this section, we extend the
model by allowing each ﬁrm to make a major investment decision at time τ. To preview our
results, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms often reduce their investment in response to government-induced
uncertainty. We also ﬁnd that EAR remains negative, as in the benchmark model.
Between times 0 and τ, each ﬁrm is fully invested in its risky technology (equation (1)),
as in the benchmark model. At time τ, each ﬁrm has the option to disinvest and switch all
of its capital into a risk-free storage technology whose constant return is normalized to zero.
If the ﬁrm decides to disinvest, its capital earns the zero rate of return from time τ until
time T; otherwise its proﬁtability continues to follow equation (1). Partial investment in the
two technologies is ruled out, for simplicity.
All ﬁrms make their investment decisions at the same time τ at which the government
makes its policy decision. This simplifying assumption captures the idea that ﬁrms decide
on their investment while facing uncertainty about the government’s future policy, and the
government decides on its policy while taking into account its impact on ﬁrm investment.
As before, the government and the ﬁrms have the same beliefs about government policies
(equations (3) and (8)). We solve for the Nash equilibrium in which the government’s policy
choice is optimal given the ﬁrms’ investment decisions, and each ﬁrm’s investment decision
is optimal given the decisions of all other ﬁrms as well as the government’s decision rule.
Proposition 9. In equilibrium at time τ, a randomly-selected fraction ατ ∈ [0,1] of ﬁrms
continue investing in their risky technologies, while the remaining ﬁrms disinvest and park
30their capital in the risk-free technology. The government changes its policy if and only if
b gτ < g(c,ατ) , (49)
where the threshold g(c,ατ) and the equilibrium value of ατ are described below.
Similar to Proposition 2, Proposition 9 shows that a policy change occurs if b gτ is below
a threshold, so that a policy is replaced if it is perceived to have a suﬃciently unfavorable
impact on proﬁtability. A key diﬀerence from Proposition 2 is that the threshold g (c,ατ)
depends on the fraction of investing ﬁrms, ατ, which in turn depends on b gτ.
To shed light on Proposition 9, we ﬁrst take the government’s perspective. The govern-
ment makes its policy decision by taking the ﬁrms’ investment decisions, ατ, as given. Recall
that a policy change occurs if and only if the condition (12) holds. This condition involves








(T−τ)+σ(ZT−Zτ) + (1 − ατ) , (50)
where g ≡ gold if there is no policy change and g ≡ gnew if there is a policy change. Using
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for i = yes,no, and gno = b gτ, σ2
no = b σ2
τ, gyes = 0, σ2
yes = σ2
g. The right-hand side of (51)
decreases with b gτ, whereas the left-hand side does not depend on b gτ. Therefore, the condition
(51) implies the cutoﬀ rule in Proposition 9, where the cutoﬀ g (c,ατ) is the value of b gτ for
which the left-hand side of (51) equals the right-hand side.
Next, we take the ﬁrms’ perspective. At the time of their investment decisions, ﬁrms do
not know whether the government’s policy will change. Even though ﬁrms observe b gτ, they
do not observe g (c,ατ) (because they do not observe c), so they are unable to fully anticipate
the government’s action. Firms invest in a way that maximizes their market value. Market
value obeys equation (17), where the state price density πt in equation (16) is computed
based on equation (50). If ﬁrm i decides to switch to the risk-free technology at time τ, then


















Therefore, each ﬁrm chooses to remain invested in the risky technology if and only if doing
so results in a market-to-book ratio greater than one at time τ.
31If ﬁrm i decides at time τ to remain invested in its risky technology, its market value






























−γi if policy does not change
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τ+ as in equation (23), except that the weights ωτ are given in equation (A9) in
the Appendix. The values of Mi
τ/Bi
τ are equal across i because all ﬁrms are identical ex
ante. Therefore, if Mi
τ/Bi
τ > 1, all ﬁrms invest in their risky technologies, and ατ = 1 in
equilibrium. For an interior solution 0 < ατ < 1 to occur, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between
the risky and risk-free technologies, so that Mi
τ/Bi
τ = 1 for all i. Combining this condition
















The right-hand-side of equation (54) depends on ατ, which aﬀects both ωτ and the M/B
ratios. If there exists a value of ατ strictly between 0 and 1 for which equation (54) holds,
then this is the equilibrium value of ατ in Proposition 9. If instead the right-hand side of
equation (54) exceeds one for all ατ ∈ [0,1], then ατ = 1 in equilibrium, and all the results
from Sections 2. and 3. hold. If the right-hand side of equation (54) is smaller than one for
all ατ ∈ [0,1], then the equilibrium features ατ = 0, an uninteresting case of no investment.
For the parameter values in Table 1, the equilibriumsolution is ατ = 1 (no disinvestment),
so that all the results from the benchmark model apply also to the problem analyzed here.
To analyze the eﬀect of disinvestment, we reduce the value of µ from its benchmark value
of 10% to 2%, which is the largest integer percentage value for which ατ < 1 in equilibrium
(i.e., for all µ ≥ 3%, the equilibrium has ατ = 1). All other parameter values are in Table 1.
We set the downturn length to ﬁve years, as before. We solve the problem numerically and
plot the results in Figure 14.
Panel A of Figure 14 reports the equilibrium value of ατ as a function of σc and σg. We
see that higher values of σc or σg imply lower values of ατ. Fixing σc = 10% and increasing
σg from 1% to 2% to 3%, the fraction of ﬁrms that remain invested in the risky technology
decreases from 1 to 0.87 to 0.77, respectively. The eﬀect of σc is weaker: ﬁxing σg = 2%, ατ
28The same condition is obtained as a ﬁrst-order condition in an alternative formulation of the problem in
which a social planner chooses ατ to maximize the investors’ expected utility. See the Technical Appendix.
32decreases from 0.88 to 0.85 as we increase σc from 0 to 20%. In short, both policy uncertainty
and political uncertainty reduce aggregate investment.
Panel B of Figure 14 plots EAR as a function of σc and σg. The plot is similar to that in
Panel A of Figure 7, which corresponds to the benchmark model (in which we force ατ = 1).
For σg = 1%, EAR is the same as in Figure 7 because ατ = 1 in equilibrium (see Panel A of
Figure 14). For σg = 2% and 3%, EAR is more negative than for σg = 1% but less negative
than its counterparts in Figure 7. For example, for σg = 2% and σc = 10%, EAR is -0.6%
compared to -1.1% in Figure 7, and the diﬀerence from Figure 7 is even larger for σg = 3%.
The reason is that a substantial fraction of ﬁrms disinvest in equilibrium (ατ < 1), thereby
reducing aggregate risk. By reducing their investment, ﬁrms essentially undo some of the
uncertainty associated with government policy. Nonetheless, EAR remains negative for all
values of σc and σg, as in the benchmark model.
Panels C and D of Figure 14 plot the expected dynamics of return volatility, σM,t, and
correlation, ρt, respectively, around a policy change at time τ = 10. Both quantities exhibit
patterns very similar to those in Panels C and D of Figure 10, which correspond to the
benchmark model (ατ = 1). The post-τ increases in σM,t and ρt are slightly smaller than in
Figure 10, as one would expect as a result of a reduction in aggregate risk, but the conclusions
are exactly the same. In short, the key asset pricing results from the benchmark model hold
also when we allow for disinvestment.
6. Extension: Diﬀerent Policy Exposures
Government policies typically aﬀect all ﬁrms, but they may aﬀect some ﬁrms more than
others. In this section, we extend our benchmark model by allowing ﬁrms to have diﬀerent
exposures to government policy. We lose many closed-form solutions and propositions, but
we gain some additional insight into the cross-section of expected stock returns. In particular,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with larger government exposures tend to have higher expected returns.
The government risk premium can be negative, though, and it is highly state-dependent.
We also ﬁnd that EAR remains negative, as in the benchmark model.
Firms are divided into N sectors, n = 1,...,N, where N is ﬁnite. Each sector n is
characterized by a nonnegative “government beta” βn, which represents a loading on the
policy impact. Speciﬁcally, the proﬁtability of each ﬁrm i in sector n is given by
dΠ
i







t is a sector-speciﬁc shock, dZi
t is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, and all Brownian motions
are independent of each other.29 Equation (55) replaces equation (1) in the benchmark model
from Section 2.; the rest of the model remains unchanged. The benchmark model is thus a
special case of this model with βn = 1 and N = 1. Similar to Proposition 1, by observing
each ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, all agents eﬀectively receive N signals
ds
n
t = (µ + β
ngt)dt + σdZ
n
t , n = 1,...,N. (56)
Let Bt denote the total capital of all ﬁrms and Bn
t denote the total capital of all ﬁrms in
sector n. We denote sector n’s share of total capital by wn







, n = 1,...,N. (57)
The N×1 vector of these shares, which we denote by wt, represents additional state variables
introduced by the presence of multiple sectors.
Proposition 10. The government changes its policy at time τ if and only if
b gτ < g(c,wτ) , (58)
where the threshold g(c,wτ) is described in the Technical Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows that a policy is replaced if its impact on proﬁtability is perceived
as suﬃciently unfavorable. This result is similar to Proposition 2, except that the threshold
for b gτ now depends also on the vector wt of the sector shares.
We solve for stock prices and their dynamics before time τ by using numerical methods.
The pricing results after time τ are in closed form. Those results highlight the importance
of the new state variable wt, which aﬀects not only the level of stock prices but also their
volatility as well as the expected rates of return. All of the asset pricing results, along with
the results on learning, are presented and proved in the Technical Appendix.
Figure 15 plots various results obtained in a two-sector framework (i.e., N = 2). We
denote the two sectors by H and L. The government betas of the two sectors are βH and
βL, where βH ≥ βL. We vary these betas while holding their average equal to one. In the
baseline case, explored in Panel A, we set βH = 1.5 and βL = 0.5. We also vary the relative
size of the high-beta sector, which we denote by wt = BH
t /(BH
t + BL
t ). In the baseline case,
examined in Panel A, we set w0 = 0.5, so that as of time 0, half the ﬁrms have high betas
and half have low betas. Unless speciﬁed otherwise, the parameters are from Table 1.
29We could make the dZn
t shocks correlated at the cost of additional analytical complexity. Given our
interest in the cross-sectional diﬀerences in stock returns as opposed to their level, such cross-correlation
seems to be of second-order importance, so we focus on the simpler case of no correlation.
346.1. The Expected Announcement Return
Panel A of Figure 15 plots EAR, obtained by simulations for the baseline case, as a function
of σg and σc. This panel is the counterpart of Figure 4, which corresponds to the benchmark
model. As in Figure 4, EAR is always negative and its magnitude is increasing in both σg
and σc. The magnitudes of EARs are also close to those from Figure 4.
Panel B of Figure 15 plots EAR as a function of βH −βL, for three diﬀerent values of w0.
The values of σg and σc are ﬁxed at their baseline values from Table 1. When βH −βL = 0,
both sectors have the same government beta of one. EAR is then -0.6%, which is close to
the corresponding value of -0.5% in the benchmark model (Figure 4). These two values are
diﬀerent even though all ﬁrms have a beta of one in both models. The reason is that the
speeds of learning in the two models are diﬀerent. The two-sector model has two signals
about gt (equation (56)), whereas there is only one signal in the benchmark model (equation
(7)). As a result, learning in the two-sector model is faster.30 Therefore, the diﬀerence
between the prior and posterior variances is larger, and the discount rate eﬀect is stronger;
hence the slightly more negative EAR. Panel B also shows that EAR is more negative for
larger values of w0. For example, for βH − βL = 1, EAR is -0.4% for w0 = 0.2, -0.6% for
w0 = 0.5, and -0.8% for w0 = 0.8. When w0 is larger, the high-beta ﬁrms account for a larger
fraction of the aggregate market. As a result, the risk associated with learning about gt is
harder to diversify and shocks to b gt are more highly correlated with the stochastic discount
factor. The increase in uncertainty at time τ thus generates a larger discount rate eﬀect,
leading to a more negative EAR when w0 is larger. Finally, it is useful to consider the case
of βH − βL = 2, in which βH = 2 and βL = 0. In the limiting case w0 → 0, all ﬁrms have
zero beta; as a result, policy changes become irrelevant and EAR→ 0.
6.2. Government Betas and Expected Stock Returns
Given the government’s pervasive eﬀect on the private sector, policy uncertainty is unlikely
to be fully diversiﬁable. It thus seems natural to ask whether ﬁrms that are more exposed
to policy uncertainty oﬀer higher expected returns. In this subsection, we relate government
betas to expected stock returns. The instantaneous expected stock returns are given by the




30We can prove that learning in the multiple-sector model is faster than in the benchmark model under
the condition β0β > 1, where β is an N × 1 vector of βn’s. This condition is trivially satisﬁed here.
35Panels C and D of Figure 15 plot µH
t − µL
t as a function of βH − βL. We consider three
diﬀerent values of wt and set t = 5 years (which is half-way between time 0 and time τ). We
set wt rather than w0 as in the previous paragraph because our focus is on the conditional
expected return at time t rather than EAR as of time 0.
Panels C and D show that as the share of sector H increases, so does µH
t − µL
t , holding
βH−βL constant. There are two reasons for this result. First, a larger wt makes the b gt shocks
more powerful, as explained above. As a result, a higher government beta has a larger eﬀect
on the expected return. Second, there is an interesting size eﬀect even when both sectors
have equal government betas (βH −βL = 0). Both panels show that equal betas imply equal
risk premia (i.e., µH
t − µL
t = 0) only when both sectors are equally large (wt = 0.5). When
wt 6= 0.5, the risk premia are diﬀerent. For example, wt = 0.8 implies µH
t − µL
t = 0.7% per
year, and wt = 0.2 implies µH
t − µL
t = −0.7%. Firms in the larger sector command a higher
risk premium because their capital Bi
t covaries more closely with aggregate capital Bt, and
the higher covariance makes the larger-sector ﬁrms riskier. This size eﬀect can make µH
t −µL
t
negative even when βH −βL is positive if wt is low; we observe such instances in both panels
when wt = 0.2.
To abstract from the size eﬀect, suppose both sectors are equally large (wt = 0.5). In
that case, Panels C and D always show µH
t − µL
t > 0, indicating that the higher-beta ﬁrms
earn higher expected returns. In addition, µH
t − µL
t is generally increasing in βH − βL. The
only exception occurs in Panel D for large values of βH − βL. The reason is that in Panel
D, we have b gt = −2%. With b gt < 0, the H sector is expected to shrink relative to the L
sector (because it loads more heavily on b gt), especially when βH − βL is large. As a result,
the expected future impact of b gt is diminished, reducing the impact of the b gt shocks on stock
prices when b gt < 0 and βH−βL is large. With this caveat, we can state that larger diﬀerences
in government betas generally translate into larger diﬀerences in expected returns.
Finally, a comparison of Panels C and D shows that µH
t − µL
t is substantially larger for
b gt = 2% (Panel C) than for b gt = −2% (Panel D). The b gt shocks are less powerful in Panel
D, for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason, related to the expected shrinkage of the H sector, is
explained in the previous paragraph. The second reason is that the probability of a policy
change is higher in Panel D. When b gt = 2%, the prevailing policy is likely to be retained;
as a result, the b gt shocks are likely to be permanent. In contrast, the same shocks have a
shorter expected duration when b gt = −2% because the policy change is then more likely.
Since the b gt shocks are expected to be longer-lasting when b gt is higher, the risk premium
associated with exposure to these shocks is larger as well. Overall, Panels C and D show that
36the premium for government beta risk is typically positive but also highly state-dependent.
In related empirical work, Belo, Gala, and Li (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher exposures
to the government sector (measured by the fraction of sales generated by government spend-
ing) earn higher average stock returns, but only during Democratic presidential terms; the
relation ﬂips during Republican terms.31 The match between their analysis and ours is not
perfect. They measure government spending, whereas we focus on government policy more
generally. They measure return exposure to government, whereas our government betas
are proﬁtability exposures. They study Democrats versus Republicans, whereas our simple
model does not distinguish between diﬀerent types of government. Despite these diﬀerences,
it seems interesting that they estimate a state-dependent government risk premium. More
research into this state dependence is clearly warranted.
7. Conclusions
We conduct a theoretical analysis of the eﬀects of changes in government policy on stock
prices. Our simple general equilibrium model makes numerous testable predictions. Stock
market returns at the announcements of policy changes should be negative unless the policy
being replaced is perceived as suﬃciently harmful to proﬁtability. Averaging across all
policy changes, the expected announcement return should be negative. The magnitude of
this negative return should be large if uncertainty about government policy is large, as well
as if the policy change is preceded by a short or shallow downturn. The distribution of stock
returns at the announcements of policy changes should be left-skewed. Policy changes should
make stock returns more volatile and more highly correlated across ﬁrms. The average stock
market return at the announcements of policy decisions, without conditioning on whether
these decisions change the policy or not, should be positive.
Our key result—that stock prices are expected to fall at the announcement of a policy
change—hinges on our assumption that the government is quasi-benevolent. Due to that as-
sumption, policy changes that raise stock prices are largely anticipated. Policy changes that
reduce prices contain a larger element of surprise, resulting in larger negative announce-
ment returns. The result might ﬂip around if the government were instead perceived as
malevolent because policy changes that beneﬁt investors would then be largely unexpected
and thus associated with large positive announcement returns. In reality, the government’s
31In another empirical study of political cycles, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) ﬁnd that the average
stock market return is higher under Democratic presidencies than under Republican presidencies.
37objectives are surely more complex than benevolence or malevolence, but they are likely
to have a benevolent tilt due to the mechanics of a democratic process. For example, the
government might maximize the probability of reelection, which is imperfectly but positively
related to the agents’ material well-being.32 Analyzing alternative objective functions for the
government in the context of our model is an interesting direction for future research.
Our model makes the simplifying assumption that the prevailing government policy can
only be replaced by a single policy that is identical a priori. It would be useful to extend the
model to allow the government to choose from multiple policies. The policy decision would
then resolve the uncertainty about which policy is chosen. As long as all potential new
policies are identical a priori, knowing which policy is chosen is irrelevant, and the multiple-
policy setting collapses to our single-policy setting. The convergence to a single-policy setting
obtains also at the opposite extreme, if the potential new policies are so diﬀerent from each
other that one of them dominates a priori. In the intermediate cases, though, the results
might depend on the prior heterogeneity in interesting ways. We are currently analyzing the
multiple-policy setting in a work in progress.
Another interesting extension would endogenize the political cost. We treat this cost as
exogenous, in the interest of simplicity, but it would be useful to build the microfoundations
for it based on the insights from the political economy literature. Such an extension could
establish new theoretical links between the ﬁnancial markets and various political economy
variables. Another theoretical extension could make the government and the investors asym-
metrically informed. While our focus is on stocks, future work can also investigate the eﬀects
of uncertainty about government policy on the prices of other assets, such as bonds.
There is also need for empirical work. The eﬀects of policy changes on asset prices
have been analyzed in various contexts, with mixed results.33 A broader analysis of policy
changes, or reforms, would be beneﬁcial. One challenge for the empirical work is the timing
of the policy decision. In some cases, this timing is clear.34 However, most reforms occur
32See Downs (1957) for an early model in which the government maximizes the probability of reelection.
After surveying the empirical literature, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) conclude that economic indicators
explain most of the variance in government support. A more recent survey by Anderson (2007) ﬁnds that
the relation between economic outcomes and election outcomes is imperfect and complicated. Brender and
Drazen (2008) ﬁnd that this relation is signiﬁcant only among the less developed countries.
33For example, Thorbecke (1997), Rigobon and Sack (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) examine the
eﬀects of changes in monetary policy on stock prices. Klingebiel, Kroszner, Laeven, and Oijen (2001) examine
stock market responses to the announcements of bank restructuring policies by East Asian governments
during the 1997-98 crisis. Ait-Sahalia et al (2010) investigate the eﬀects of policy changes during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis on interbank credit and liquidity risk premia.
34One example is the abrupt shift in the too-big-to-fail policy, mentioned in the introduction. The U.S.
government’s decision to let Lehman Brothers fail was followed by a 4.7% drop in the S&P 500 index on
38gradually, clearing multiple hurdles. For example, the ongoing reform of U.S. ﬁnancial
regulation has involved separate passages of related bills by the House and the Senate,
a subsequent reconciliation, and a continuing emergence of speciﬁc regulatory measures.
According to our model, stock prices should respond at each step of the way, with bigger
price responses following bigger increases in the probability of a policy change.35 Identifying
the pivotal steps of the key reforms is a nontrivial task. For example, Cutler (1988) examines
the stock market reaction to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. He identiﬁes two key events in
the bill’s progress—the vote by the House for the bill in December 1985, and the vote for
a similar bill by the Senate Finance Committee in May 1986—and argues that both events
surprised the market.36 With the whole paper in the American Economic Review devoted
to a single policy change, it seems clear that a careful empirical analysis of multiple policy
changes is well beyond the scope of this study. It also seems clear that such analysis would
be interesting. Our model provides a simple benchmark for the empirical evidence. Overall,
we have much to learn about the role of the government in asset pricing.
September 15, 2008. Another example, fresh as of this writing, is Germany’s surprise announcement of a
partial ban on naked short-selling late on May 18, 2010. This announcement was followed by roughly 2%
drops in the European share indices in the following morning (e.g., Germany’s DAX dropped 1.9%). This
drop is consistent with our model, but not with theories predicting that short-sale constraints lift asset prices.
35A key step in the ﬁnancial regulation reform took place on Thursday May 20, 2010. At 2.31pm, the
Senate voted by the narrowest possible margin (60 to 40) to overcome ﬁlibusters and send the bill to a ﬁnal
vote. A CNN Money article on the same afternoon read: “Wall Street reform cleared a crucial test vote
on Thursday, all but assuring ﬁnal Senate passage of the most sweeping regulatory overhaul since the New
Deal.” By the end of the day, the S&P 500 index fell 3.9%, with about half of the decline occurring in the
last hour. The Senate passed the reform bill at 8.25pm on the same day. The following morning, the U.S.
stock market fell about 1% in the ﬁrst minute of trade, followed by a rebound later in the day.
36Cutler reports that on the day after the late-night favorable House vote, the S&P 500 index fell by
0.40%; on the day after the late-night favorable Senate Finance Committee vote, the index fell by 0.49%.
39Table 1
Parameter Choices
This table reports the parameter values used in the simulations. All variables are reported on an
annual basis (except for γ, which denotes risk aversion).
σg σc µ σ σ1 T τ γ
0.02 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.10 20 10 5




























































Figure 1. Proﬁtability dynamics and the policy decision. This ﬁgure plots the expected dynamics
of b gt (solid line) and realized proﬁtability (dashed line) under the parameter values from Table 1. Realized
proﬁtability is the average proﬁtability across all ﬁrms, plotted in excess of µ so that its unconditional mean
is zero. The ﬁgure also plots the threshold g(c) (dotted line). All three lines are average paths across many
simulated samples. The top panel averages across the samples in which a policy change occurred at time
τ = 10, whereas the bottom panel conditions on no policy change.
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Figure 2. Proﬁtability dynamics conditional on a policy change: The roles of policy uncer-
tainty and political uncertainty. This ﬁgure plots the expected dynamics of b gt (solid line) and realized
proﬁtability (dashed line) conditional on a policy change at time τ = 10. Realized proﬁtability is the average
proﬁtability across all ﬁrms, plotted in excess of µ so that its unconditional mean is zero. The ﬁgure also
plots the threshold g(c) (dotted line). All three lines are average paths across many simulated samples in
which a policy change occurred at time τ. The parameter values are in Table 1 except for policy uncertainty







































































g∗ g(0) ˆ gτ 0
Panel D.
Figure 3. Probability of a policy change. The shaded area represents the probability of a policy change,
as perceived by the investors just before time τ. The bell curve represents the normal distribution of the
random threshold g(c). The four panels illustrate four possible locations of b gτ relative to g∗, g(0), and zero.
The vertical dotted lines are drawn at g∗, g(0), and zero. The normal distribution as well as the values of
g∗ and g(0) are computed based on the parameter values in Table 1.






























Figure 4. Expected announcement return. This ﬁgure plots the expectation of the announcement
return R(b gτ), which is the instantaneous stock return at the announcement of a policy change at time τ.
The expectation integrates out uncertainty about b gτ as perceived at time 0, as well as uncertainty about c
conditional on the policy being changed. We vary σg and σc, and all other parameters are from Table 1.

















Panel A. Announcement Return


























Figure 5. Announcement return and the downturn length and depth. Panel A plots the announce-
ment return R(b gτ), the instantaneous stock return at the announcement of a policy change at time τ, as a
function of the length and depth of the downturn that precedes the policy change. The downturn length is
computed as τ − t0 > 0, where b gt0 = 0. The downturn depth is given by the number of standard deviations
by which b gt drops during the downturn. Panel B plots the corresponding probability of a policy change, as
perceived by investors just before time τ. The parameters are from Table 1.
















Panel A. Announcement Return, σg = 1%



















Panel C. Probability of a Policy Change, σg = 1%



















Panel B. Announcement Return, σg = 3%























Figure 6. Announcement return and the downturn length and depth: The role of policy
uncertainty. Panels A and B plot the announcement return R(b gτ), the instantaneous stock return at the
announcement of a policy change at time τ, as a function of the length and depth of the downturn that
precedes the policy change. The downturn length is computed as τ − t0 > 0, where b gt0 = 0. The downturn
depth is given by the number of standard deviations by which b gt drops during the downturn. Panels C and
D plot the corresponding probabilities of a policy change, as perceived by investors just before time τ. The
parameters are from Table 1, except that the baseline value σg = 2% is replaced by σg = 1% (Panels A and
C) and σg = 3% (Panels B and D).




















































Figure 7. Expected announcement return and the downturn length. This ﬁgure plots the expec-
tation of the announcement return R(b gτ), which is the instantaneous stock return at the announcement of a
policy change at time τ. The expectation integrates out uncertainty about b gτ as perceived at the beginning
of the downturn, as well as uncertainty about c conditional on the policy being changed. The downturn
length is τ − t0 = 5 years in Panel A and 1 year in Panel B. We vary σg and σc, and all other parameters
are from Table 1.
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Figure 8. Probability distribution of stock returns on the day of the announcement of a policy
change. This ﬁgure plots the probability distribution of stock returns on the day when a policy change
is announced. These per-day stock returns have two components: a jump component R(b gτ) pertaining
to the instant of the announcement, and the diﬀusion component Mτ/Mτ−∆τ − 1 covering the rest of the
announcement day (∆τ = 1/252 years). This distribution is comparable with an empirical distribution of
daily announcement returns. The downturn length is τ − t0 = 5 years. We vary σg and σc, and all other
parameters are from Table 1.


















Panel A. Expected Return at Announcement of a Policy Decision


























































Figure 9. Expected return at the announcement of a policy decision. Panel A plots the expected
value of the jump in stock prices at the announcement of a policy decision, without conditioning on whether
the decision is to change the policy or not. This value, E(JM), represents the unconditional risk premium
investors demand for facing a jump in SDF at the announcement. Panel B reports the expected jump
conditional on the announcement of a policy change, E(J
yes
M ). This panel coincides with Panel A of Figure
7. Panel C reports the expected jump conditional on the announcement of no policy change, E(Jno
M ). All
three expectations integrate out uncertainty about b gτ as perceived at the beginning of the downturn. The
downturn length is τ − t0 = 5 years. We vary σg and σc, and all other parameters are from Table 1.



















































































































Figure 10. Properties of returns around policy decisions that result in a policy change. This
ﬁgure plots the expected dynamics of the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, σπ,t (Panel A), the
conditional expected stock market return, µM,t (Panel B), the conditional volatility of stock market returns,
σM,t (Panel C), and the pairwise correlation between stocks, ρt (Panel D), all conditional on a policy change
at time τ = 10. The jump-related components at time τ are not plotted. The downturn length is τ −t0 = 5
years, so that b g5 = 0. The parameters are in Table 1, except for σg, which takes three diﬀerent values, 1%,
2%, and 3% per year.
























Panel C. Return Volatility










































Panel A. SDF Volatility


















































Figure 11. Properties of returns around policy decisions that result in no policy change. This
ﬁgure plots the expected dynamics of the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, σπ,t (Panel A), the
conditional expected stock market return, µM,t (Panel B), the conditional volatility of stock market returns,
σM,t (Panel C), and the pairwise correlation between stocks, ρt (Panel D), all conditional on no policy change
at time τ = 10. The jump-related components at time τ are not plotted. The downturn length is τ −t0 = 5
years, so that b g5 = 0. The parameters are in Table 1, except for σg, which takes three diﬀerent values, 1%,
2%, and 3% per year.












































Panel B. Market Value, Length = 5
Time
























Figure 12. The level and volatility of stock prices around policy changes. This ﬁgure plots the
dynamics of the level and volatility of stock prices around policy changes at time τ = 10 in two scenarios:
(i) when policy changes are allowed (our model—solid line), and (ii) when policy changes are precluded
(hypothetical scenario—dashed line). Panels A and B plot the expected dynamics of the stock market value
Mt, whereas Panels C and D plot the expected dynamics of stock market volatility σM,t. Market value is in
units of book value at time 0; volatility is in percent per year. The downturn length is τ − t0 = 1 year in
Panels A and C, but 5 years in Panels B and D. The parameters are in Table 1.



















































Panel C. Return Volatility













































Figure 13. Endogenous timing of a policy change. Panel A plots the expected stock return, EAR,
at the endogenously-timed announcement of a policy change. The timing of the policy change is optimally
chosen by the government from the set τ ∈ [1,2,...,19]. Whereas Panel A averages returns across all
τ, Panel B plots EAR as a function of τ. Panels C and D plot the expected dynamics of σM,t and ρt,
respectively, around a policy change. The results are plotted in event time, with time 0 marking the policy
change (time τ). The parameters are in Table 1, except for σg, which takes three diﬀerent values, 1%, 2%,
and 3% per year.
































































































Figure 14. Investment adjustment. This ﬁgure plots the results from the extension of the benchmark
model in which ﬁrms can disinvest at time τ. Panel A plots the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms that choose to
remain invested in the risky technology after the policy change. Panel B plots the corresponding stock return
expected at the announcement of a policy change, or EAR. Panels C and D plot the expected dynamics of
σM,t and ρt, respectively, around a policy change at time τ = 10. The parameters are in Table 1, except
that µ = 0.02 (we reduce µ from its benchmark value to obtain α < 1 in equilibrium) and σg takes three
diﬀerent values, 1%, 2%, and 3% per year. The downturn length is set to 5 years in all four panels.






































































































Figure 15. Diﬀerent government policy exposures. This ﬁgure plots the results from the extension
of the benchmark model in which there are two types of ﬁrms with diﬀerent exposures to government policy,
βH and βL. Panel A plots the stock return expected at the announcement of a policy change, or EAR, when
half of the ﬁrms as of time 0 have βH = 1.5 and the other half have βL = 0.5. Panel B plots EAR as a
function of βH − βL while varying w0, the fraction of high-beta ﬁrms as of time 0. Panels C and D plot the
diﬀerence in the conditional expected returns of the high-beta and low-beta ﬁrms, µH − µL, as a function
of βH − βL while varying wt, the fraction of high-beta ﬁrms as of time t = 5 years. In Panel C, b gt = 2%,
whereas in Panel D, b gt = −2%. In Panels B, C, and D, we vary βH − βL while holding the average of the
two betas constant, (βH + βL)/2 = 1. Unless speciﬁed otherwise, the parameters are from Table 1.
55Appendix
The Appendix contains the formulas that are mentioned in the text but omitted for the
sake of brevity. The proofs of all results are available in the companion Technical Appendix,
which is downloadable from the authors’ websites.
Proposition A1. In the benchmark model for t ≤ τ, the state price density is given by
πt = B
−γ
t Ω(b gt,t) , (A1)
where
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Corollary A1 (used in Proposition 6). In the benchmark model for t ≤ τ, the volatility of
the stochastic discount factor is given by
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56Corollary A2 (used in Proposition 7). In the benchmark model for t ≤ τ, the mean and
volatility parameters of the return process in Proposition 7 are given by












µM = σπ,tσM,t , (A5)
where σπ,t and σM,t are given in equations (A2) and (A4), respectively.
Corollary A3 (used in Corollary 9). In the benchmark model for t < τ, the correlation








Proposition A3. Let the timing of the policy change be endogenous as in Section 4. For
every t ∈ [τi,τi+1), the indirect utility function V (b gt,Bt,t) from equation (46) is given by
V (b gt,Bt,t) = B
1−γ
t Φ(b gt,t) , (A7)
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The boundary conditions at time τi are given by














where the expectation is taken with respect to c just before the policy decision at time τi.
The ﬁnal condition at time T is Φ(b gT,T) = 1
1−γ.





τ+ as in equation (23), except that the weights ωτ are given by
ωτ =
pτ










[ατeεyes(τ,T) + (1 − ατ)]
−γ
o
and pτ is the probabilityof a policy change as perceivedjust before time τ (i.e.,the probability
that the condition (49) holds). This probability is computed numerically.
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